The article discusses two fundamental doctrines of empiricism: the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, and reductionism. It argues that both doctrines are untenable. The first doctrine posits a clear distinction between analytic truths, which are true by definition and independent of experience, and synthetic truths, which depend on empirical facts. The second doctrine claims that any meaningful statement can be reduced to a logical structure involving terms that refer to direct experience. The author critiques these doctrines, noting that they blur the boundaries between speculative metaphysics and natural science and lead to pragmatism. The text explores the concept of analyticity, arguing that the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is flawed. It examines the nature of meaning, the role of synonymy, and the challenges in defining analytic statements. The author critiques the idea that analytic statements are true because they are logically necessary, pointing out that this approach fails to account for the complexity of language and meaning. The discussion also addresses the problem of synonymy, the role of definitions, and the difficulties in determining the truth of statements based on synonymy. The article further examines the verification theory of meaning, which posits that the meaning of a statement is determined by its empirical verification or falsification. However, the author argues that this theory is inadequate because it relies on a form of reductionism that is too simplistic. The text also critiques the reductionist approach to meaning, which attempts to reduce all meaningful statements to direct experience, and highlights the limitations of such an approach. Ultimately, the article concludes that both doctrines of empiricism are flawed and that a more nuanced understanding of meaning and truth is necessary. It suggests that the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is not as clear-cut as traditionally believed and that the role of experience in determining the truth of statements is more complex. The author advocates for a pragmatic approach that recognizes the interdependence of language, experience, and logical structure in the determination of truth.The article discusses two fundamental doctrines of empiricism: the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, and reductionism. It argues that both doctrines are untenable. The first doctrine posits a clear distinction between analytic truths, which are true by definition and independent of experience, and synthetic truths, which depend on empirical facts. The second doctrine claims that any meaningful statement can be reduced to a logical structure involving terms that refer to direct experience. The author critiques these doctrines, noting that they blur the boundaries between speculative metaphysics and natural science and lead to pragmatism. The text explores the concept of analyticity, arguing that the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is flawed. It examines the nature of meaning, the role of synonymy, and the challenges in defining analytic statements. The author critiques the idea that analytic statements are true because they are logically necessary, pointing out that this approach fails to account for the complexity of language and meaning. The discussion also addresses the problem of synonymy, the role of definitions, and the difficulties in determining the truth of statements based on synonymy. The article further examines the verification theory of meaning, which posits that the meaning of a statement is determined by its empirical verification or falsification. However, the author argues that this theory is inadequate because it relies on a form of reductionism that is too simplistic. The text also critiques the reductionist approach to meaning, which attempts to reduce all meaningful statements to direct experience, and highlights the limitations of such an approach. Ultimately, the article concludes that both doctrines of empiricism are flawed and that a more nuanced understanding of meaning and truth is necessary. It suggests that the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is not as clear-cut as traditionally believed and that the role of experience in determining the truth of statements is more complex. The author advocates for a pragmatic approach that recognizes the interdependence of language, experience, and logical structure in the determination of truth.