In 2004, Fehr and Fischbacher examined third-party punishment and social norms through experiments. They found that third parties often punish violations of distribution and cooperation norms, even though their own payoffs are not affected. This suggests that strong reciprocity extends to third-party behavior. The study also showed that third-party punishment games are useful for understanding social norms. Second parties, whose payoffs are affected by violations, punish more strongly than third parties. Questionnaire evidence supported the role of fairness and negative emotions in third-party sanctions. The experiments revealed that third-party punishment is more prevalent when the norm violation is severe. The study also compared second and third-party punishment, finding that second-party punishment is stronger for transfers below the egalitarian level. The results highlight the importance of social norms in human behavior and the role of third-party enforcement in maintaining them. The findings contribute to the understanding of social preferences and the mechanisms underlying norm enforcement.In 2004, Fehr and Fischbacher examined third-party punishment and social norms through experiments. They found that third parties often punish violations of distribution and cooperation norms, even though their own payoffs are not affected. This suggests that strong reciprocity extends to third-party behavior. The study also showed that third-party punishment games are useful for understanding social norms. Second parties, whose payoffs are affected by violations, punish more strongly than third parties. Questionnaire evidence supported the role of fairness and negative emotions in third-party sanctions. The experiments revealed that third-party punishment is more prevalent when the norm violation is severe. The study also compared second and third-party punishment, finding that second-party punishment is stronger for transfers below the egalitarian level. The results highlight the importance of social norms in human behavior and the role of third-party enforcement in maintaining them. The findings contribute to the understanding of social preferences and the mechanisms underlying norm enforcement.