This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The authors focus on the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. They introduce the concept of "self-generation," which allows properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of static problems. The paper demonstrates that these solutions often have a "bang-bang" property, simplifying the equilibria that need to be considered. The results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, generalizing earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. The bang-bang theorem is strengthened to a necessity result, showing that under certain conditions, efficient sequential equilibria have the property that after every history, the value to players of the remainder of the equilibrium must be an extreme point of the equilibrium value set. The paper also provides a proof of the monotonicity of the equilibrium average value set in the discount factor and an iterative procedure for computing the value set.This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The authors focus on the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. They introduce the concept of "self-generation," which allows properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of static problems. The paper demonstrates that these solutions often have a "bang-bang" property, simplifying the equilibria that need to be considered. The results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, generalizing earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. The bang-bang theorem is strengthened to a necessity result, showing that under certain conditions, efficient sequential equilibria have the property that after every history, the value to players of the remainder of the equilibrium must be an extreme point of the equilibrium value set. The paper also provides a proof of the monotonicity of the equilibrium average value set in the discount factor and an iterative procedure for computing the value set.