First published online 1 May 2009 | PETER A. HALL and DANIEL W. GINGERICH
This article provides a statistical analysis of the 'varieties of capitalism' perspective on comparative capitalism, focusing on the institutional complementarities across different subspheres of the political economy. The authors construct indices to assess whether patterns of coordination in OECD economies align with the predictions of the theory. They test the impact of institutional complementarities in labor relations and corporate governance on growth rates and examine the durability of varieties of capitalism through an analysis of institutional change in the 1980s and 1990s. The study finds strong support for the theory's predictions, indicating that interactions across institutions in different subspheres are crucial for accurate assessments of the economic impact of institutional reforms. The results suggest that countries characterized by high levels of strategic co-ordination in labor relations tend to cluster in the northeast quadrant of a two-dimensional space, while those with high levels of market co-ordination in labor relations cluster in the southwest quadrant. The analysis also reveals systematic variations across other spheres of the political economy, such as product-market regulation, social protection, training systems, and inter-firm relations, supporting the theory's claim of institutional congruence.This article provides a statistical analysis of the 'varieties of capitalism' perspective on comparative capitalism, focusing on the institutional complementarities across different subspheres of the political economy. The authors construct indices to assess whether patterns of coordination in OECD economies align with the predictions of the theory. They test the impact of institutional complementarities in labor relations and corporate governance on growth rates and examine the durability of varieties of capitalism through an analysis of institutional change in the 1980s and 1990s. The study finds strong support for the theory's predictions, indicating that interactions across institutions in different subspheres are crucial for accurate assessments of the economic impact of institutional reforms. The results suggest that countries characterized by high levels of strategic co-ordination in labor relations tend to cluster in the northeast quadrant of a two-dimensional space, while those with high levels of market co-ordination in labor relations cluster in the southwest quadrant. The analysis also reveals systematic variations across other spheres of the political economy, such as product-market regulation, social protection, training systems, and inter-firm relations, supporting the theory's claim of institutional congruence.