This paper presents a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol and multiparty protocols with an honest majority, achieving unconditional secrecy without relying on computational intractability assumptions. The protocol allows any multiparty protocol or game with incomplete information to be achieved if a majority of players are honest. The main result is a polynomial-time VSS protocol that tolerates up to t < n/2 faulty players, with unconditional secrecy and exponentially small error probability. A new tool called Information Checking is introduced, which enables authentication without cryptographic assumptions and is a weaker version of digital signatures. The protocol ensures that any set of t+1 honest players can reveal the correct secret, while no set of t players has any information about it. The results are extended to incomplete communication networks, showing that any multiparty protocol can be achieved if at most t players are faulty. The paper also presents a protocol for Byzantine agreement in incomplete networks, achieving error-free communication with exponentially small error probability. The results demonstrate the importance of the Information Checking idea and its potential applications in secure multiparty computation.This paper presents a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol and multiparty protocols with an honest majority, achieving unconditional secrecy without relying on computational intractability assumptions. The protocol allows any multiparty protocol or game with incomplete information to be achieved if a majority of players are honest. The main result is a polynomial-time VSS protocol that tolerates up to t < n/2 faulty players, with unconditional secrecy and exponentially small error probability. A new tool called Information Checking is introduced, which enables authentication without cryptographic assumptions and is a weaker version of digital signatures. The protocol ensures that any set of t+1 honest players can reveal the correct secret, while no set of t players has any information about it. The results are extended to incomplete communication networks, showing that any multiparty protocol can be achieved if at most t players are faulty. The paper also presents a protocol for Byzantine agreement in incomplete networks, achieving error-free communication with exponentially small error probability. The results demonstrate the importance of the Information Checking idea and its potential applications in secure multiparty computation.