June 2002 | Christoph Hauert, Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund
The paper "Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Co-operation in Public Goods Games" by Christoph Hauert, Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer, and Karl Sigmund explores the evolution of cooperation among non-related individuals in public goods games. The authors present a mechanism where players can optionally participate in the game, which helps to foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. This mechanism allows cooperation to persist even when interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is random. The study uses evolutionary game theory to model the dynamics of cooperation, deflection, and loners (non-participants) in both well-mixed and spatial populations. The results show that the option to drop out of the game maintains a balance between cooperation and defection, preventing mutual defection and allowing cooperation to survive in larger groups. The findings are robust across various population structures and adaptation mechanisms, highlighting the effectiveness of voluntary participation in promoting cooperation.The paper "Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Co-operation in Public Goods Games" by Christoph Hauert, Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer, and Karl Sigmund explores the evolution of cooperation among non-related individuals in public goods games. The authors present a mechanism where players can optionally participate in the game, which helps to foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. This mechanism allows cooperation to persist even when interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is random. The study uses evolutionary game theory to model the dynamics of cooperation, deflection, and loners (non-participants) in both well-mixed and spatial populations. The results show that the option to drop out of the game maintains a balance between cooperation and defection, preventing mutual defection and allowing cooperation to survive in larger groups. The findings are robust across various population structures and adaptation mechanisms, highlighting the effectiveness of voluntary participation in promoting cooperation.