Jan-Werner Müller's concise book on populism is direct yet evasive, insightful and provocative, yet unsatisfying. The book is organized into three parts: what populists say, what they do, and how to deal with them. It also addresses three concerns simultaneously: identifying populism, diagnosing conditions favorable to it, and what better, non-populist politics should be like. Müller is most successful in identifying populism, but his diagnosis of contributing conditions and ideas for a preferable politics are weak, and if widely shared, will contribute to more rather than less of the politics he fears. Müller's basic description of populism is persuasive. Populism involves a "moralistic imagination of politics … that sets a morally pure and fully unified [but fictional] people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior." Consequently, populists are anti-pluralist. Only they can represent the people, which, to be unified, must exclude all those who do not fit in (e.g., various elites, minorities, welfare scroungers, multiculturalists). Because populists think the people's will has been betrayed, they are willing to restore its rightful place at the centre of political decision-making even if that involves means that are anti-democratic, anti-liberal and unconstitutional. In fact, once in power, populists are inclined to do the following: colonize the state and judiciary with their partisans; engage in clientelism in exchange for broad political support; and suppress opposition within civil society to maintain the illusion of a unified people. Müller's favourite examples include Viktor Orbán, Hugo Chávez, George Wallace, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Donald Trump and Geert Wilders. However, figures or parties often regarded as populist, such as Bernie Sanders, Syriza or the Indignados, do not qualify in Müller's scheme because even though they might attack elites in the name of the people, they do not treat the people as a morally pure, unified whole; they are not anti-pluralist or anti-democratic. Müller rightly takes on the challenge of explaining populism’s recent success. The general problem is that “all is not well” in the democratic world. Unfortunately, this mild phrase reflects a series of bland diagnoses found throughout the book. Müller's suggestions regarding the commitments we must make to generate a democratic fightback are not convincing. His diagnosis of populism's conditions of possibility is flawed. Müller's ambitions are restricted by his political horizon: liberal democratic capitalism cannot imagine anything other than itself. Strengthening our party systems is on his list. Müller also provides a lengthy comparison of the differences between democracy and populism. Müller's wager is that if you are persuaded by his strict depiction of populism, you will necessarily support the liberal democratic side of the comparison. This will convince some readers; others will find it entirely presumptuous regardless ofJan-Werner Müller's concise book on populism is direct yet evasive, insightful and provocative, yet unsatisfying. The book is organized into three parts: what populists say, what they do, and how to deal with them. It also addresses three concerns simultaneously: identifying populism, diagnosing conditions favorable to it, and what better, non-populist politics should be like. Müller is most successful in identifying populism, but his diagnosis of contributing conditions and ideas for a preferable politics are weak, and if widely shared, will contribute to more rather than less of the politics he fears. Müller's basic description of populism is persuasive. Populism involves a "moralistic imagination of politics … that sets a morally pure and fully unified [but fictional] people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior." Consequently, populists are anti-pluralist. Only they can represent the people, which, to be unified, must exclude all those who do not fit in (e.g., various elites, minorities, welfare scroungers, multiculturalists). Because populists think the people's will has been betrayed, they are willing to restore its rightful place at the centre of political decision-making even if that involves means that are anti-democratic, anti-liberal and unconstitutional. In fact, once in power, populists are inclined to do the following: colonize the state and judiciary with their partisans; engage in clientelism in exchange for broad political support; and suppress opposition within civil society to maintain the illusion of a unified people. Müller's favourite examples include Viktor Orbán, Hugo Chávez, George Wallace, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Donald Trump and Geert Wilders. However, figures or parties often regarded as populist, such as Bernie Sanders, Syriza or the Indignados, do not qualify in Müller's scheme because even though they might attack elites in the name of the people, they do not treat the people as a morally pure, unified whole; they are not anti-pluralist or anti-democratic. Müller rightly takes on the challenge of explaining populism’s recent success. The general problem is that “all is not well” in the democratic world. Unfortunately, this mild phrase reflects a series of bland diagnoses found throughout the book. Müller's suggestions regarding the commitments we must make to generate a democratic fightback are not convincing. His diagnosis of populism's conditions of possibility is flawed. Müller's ambitions are restricted by his political horizon: liberal democratic capitalism cannot imagine anything other than itself. Strengthening our party systems is on his list. Müller also provides a lengthy comparison of the differences between democracy and populism. Müller's wager is that if you are persuaded by his strict depiction of populism, you will necessarily support the liberal democratic side of the comparison. This will convince some readers; others will find it entirely presumptuous regardless of