Bent Flyvbjerg's paper discusses megaprojects, which are large-scale, complex ventures with high costs and long timelines. They are increasingly used in various sectors, including infrastructure, energy, and technology. Megaprojects are measured in mega, giga, and tera units, with the current era being the "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Global megaproject spending is estimated at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8% of global GDP, representing the biggest investment boom in history. The paper identifies four "sublimes" – technological, political, economic, and aesthetic – that drive the scale and frequency of megaprojects. The "iron law of megaprojects" states that projects are typically over budget, over time, and over again. The "break-fix model" explains this pattern, where projects are often restarted after initial failures. Hirschman's "Hiding Hand" theory is critiqued as flawed and corrupting for megaproject thinking. The paper also highlights the "survival of the unfittest," where poorly designed projects are built instead of better ones. The conventional way of managing megaprojects is reaching a "tension point," where reform is emerging. The paper argues that megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. The conventional way of managing megaprojects is reaching a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging. The paper also discusses the "iron law of megaprojects," which states that projects are typically over budget, over time, and over again. The "break-fix model" explains this pattern, where projects are often restarted after initial failures. Hirschman's "Hiding Hand" theory is critiqued as flawed and corrupting for megaproject thinking. The paper also highlights the "survival of the unfittest," where poorly designed projects are built instead of better ones. The paper argues that megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. The conventional way of managing megaprojects is reaching a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging.Bent Flyvbjerg's paper discusses megaprojects, which are large-scale, complex ventures with high costs and long timelines. They are increasingly used in various sectors, including infrastructure, energy, and technology. Megaprojects are measured in mega, giga, and tera units, with the current era being the "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Global megaproject spending is estimated at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8% of global GDP, representing the biggest investment boom in history. The paper identifies four "sublimes" – technological, political, economic, and aesthetic – that drive the scale and frequency of megaprojects. The "iron law of megaprojects" states that projects are typically over budget, over time, and over again. The "break-fix model" explains this pattern, where projects are often restarted after initial failures. Hirschman's "Hiding Hand" theory is critiqued as flawed and corrupting for megaproject thinking. The paper also highlights the "survival of the unfittest," where poorly designed projects are built instead of better ones. The conventional way of managing megaprojects is reaching a "tension point," where reform is emerging. The paper argues that megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. The conventional way of managing megaprojects is reaching a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging. The paper also discusses the "iron law of megaprojects," which states that projects are typically over budget, over time, and over again. The "break-fix model" explains this pattern, where projects are often restarted after initial failures. Hirschman's "Hiding Hand" theory is critiqued as flawed and corrupting for megaproject thinking. The paper also highlights the "survival of the unfittest," where poorly designed projects are built instead of better ones. The paper argues that megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. The conventional way of managing megaprojects is reaching a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging.