The perceptual symbol system (PSS) theory, proposed by Barsalou, posits that perceptual representations have a role-argument structure, often implemented through frames. This structure is crucial for supporting conceptual functions like abstraction and rule use. Barsalou argues that this capacity for using structure is innate, challenging the traditional distinction between perceptual and conceptual representations. He suggests that perceptual representations are all that exists, with no amodal representations. The core of PSS is frames, which are well-suited for conceptual representation. While structured representations are used in models of perceptual processes, they are not essential for perception. Barsalou assumes that the ability to form structured representations is innate in PSS, allowing early conversion of stimuli into frame representations. This assumption is vital for PSS to account for higher-level cognitive abilities. Unlike previous approaches, PSS ties representational frames to perception rather than a central multimodal language. However, the challenge remains in demonstrating how a true perceptual system could generate such representations. The debate over whether structured representations are learned or innate is central to cognitive science. Attempts to build complex structured representations from unstructured ones have largely failed, suggesting that structured representations may be innate. Barsalou's approach is bold in linking conceptual abilities to perception, but further research is needed to validate this claim.The perceptual symbol system (PSS) theory, proposed by Barsalou, posits that perceptual representations have a role-argument structure, often implemented through frames. This structure is crucial for supporting conceptual functions like abstraction and rule use. Barsalou argues that this capacity for using structure is innate, challenging the traditional distinction between perceptual and conceptual representations. He suggests that perceptual representations are all that exists, with no amodal representations. The core of PSS is frames, which are well-suited for conceptual representation. While structured representations are used in models of perceptual processes, they are not essential for perception. Barsalou assumes that the ability to form structured representations is innate in PSS, allowing early conversion of stimuli into frame representations. This assumption is vital for PSS to account for higher-level cognitive abilities. Unlike previous approaches, PSS ties representational frames to perception rather than a central multimodal language. However, the challenge remains in demonstrating how a true perceptual system could generate such representations. The debate over whether structured representations are learned or innate is central to cognitive science. Attempts to build complex structured representations from unstructured ones have largely failed, suggesting that structured representations may be innate. Barsalou's approach is bold in linking conceptual abilities to perception, but further research is needed to validate this claim.