February 2007 | Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, Luigi Zingales
The paper examines the mechanisms and actors involved in detecting corporate fraud in the United States between 1996 and 2004. Using a comprehensive sample of 230 cases, the authors find that fraud detection is not dependent on a single mechanism but involves a wide range of actors, many of whom lack a formal mandate for fraud detection. The media (14%), industry regulators (16%), and employees (19%) play significant roles, while the SEC (6%) and auditors (14%) are less prominent. Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), only 35% of cases were discovered by mandated actors, and after SOX, this improved slightly to over 50%. The study also finds that monetary incentives for detecting fraud against the government can influence detection without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting potential benefits for extending such incentives to corporate fraud. The authors conclude that a diverse set of actors, including those with weak incentives, are crucial for effective fraud detection, highlighting the importance of a "village" approach to corporate governance.The paper examines the mechanisms and actors involved in detecting corporate fraud in the United States between 1996 and 2004. Using a comprehensive sample of 230 cases, the authors find that fraud detection is not dependent on a single mechanism but involves a wide range of actors, many of whom lack a formal mandate for fraud detection. The media (14%), industry regulators (16%), and employees (19%) play significant roles, while the SEC (6%) and auditors (14%) are less prominent. Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), only 35% of cases were discovered by mandated actors, and after SOX, this improved slightly to over 50%. The study also finds that monetary incentives for detecting fraud against the government can influence detection without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting potential benefits for extending such incentives to corporate fraud. The authors conclude that a diverse set of actors, including those with weak incentives, are crucial for effective fraud detection, highlighting the importance of a "village" approach to corporate governance.