This paper is the second part of a two-part essay examining the anthropological concept of "world." The first part argued for a single-world approach and the centrality of personhood in the human condition. This second part explores the metaphysical implications of the "world" category and its relation to the process of "worlding," defending the continued heuristic value of the anthropological concept of worldview. The paper suggests that considering the Ontological Proof of God's existence, developed by St. Anselm, helps develop a comparative theory of personhood by showing how transcendence is inherent in personal ontogenesis. The paper discusses the emergence of a mode of ethnographic analysis emphasizing the "strangeness" or transcendentality of objects of study. This "ontological turn" has led to a revival of older transcendentalist categories like animism, totemism, and shamanism, alongside a critique of traditional ethnographic tools. The paper argues that transcendence is a recurrent aspect of human experience, not confined to specific cultures or ontologies. It also discusses the influence of Evans-Pritchard and Collingwood on the development of interpretivist anthropology, emphasizing the importance of understanding human action through reflexive thinking. The paper explores the concept of "worlding" as a human disposition that opens up relationality, and the role of participation in the ontogeny of persons. It also addresses the challenges of anthropological thinking in the face of transcendentality, arguing that the mind/matter divide is problematic. The paper concludes that a single ontology is necessary for anthropology, and that transcendence can be accounted for without this divide. The paper also discusses the Ontological Proof of God's existence, developed by St. Anselm, and its implications for understanding the relationship between essence and existence. It argues that the proof is a powerful argument for how essence and existence are related, and that it has continued relevance in anthropological thought. The paper concludes that the concept of "world" is central to understanding human experience and that anthropology must engage with this concept to understand the diversity of human realities.This paper is the second part of a two-part essay examining the anthropological concept of "world." The first part argued for a single-world approach and the centrality of personhood in the human condition. This second part explores the metaphysical implications of the "world" category and its relation to the process of "worlding," defending the continued heuristic value of the anthropological concept of worldview. The paper suggests that considering the Ontological Proof of God's existence, developed by St. Anselm, helps develop a comparative theory of personhood by showing how transcendence is inherent in personal ontogenesis. The paper discusses the emergence of a mode of ethnographic analysis emphasizing the "strangeness" or transcendentality of objects of study. This "ontological turn" has led to a revival of older transcendentalist categories like animism, totemism, and shamanism, alongside a critique of traditional ethnographic tools. The paper argues that transcendence is a recurrent aspect of human experience, not confined to specific cultures or ontologies. It also discusses the influence of Evans-Pritchard and Collingwood on the development of interpretivist anthropology, emphasizing the importance of understanding human action through reflexive thinking. The paper explores the concept of "worlding" as a human disposition that opens up relationality, and the role of participation in the ontogeny of persons. It also addresses the challenges of anthropological thinking in the face of transcendentality, arguing that the mind/matter divide is problematic. The paper concludes that a single ontology is necessary for anthropology, and that transcendence can be accounted for without this divide. The paper also discusses the Ontological Proof of God's existence, developed by St. Anselm, and its implications for understanding the relationship between essence and existence. It argues that the proof is a powerful argument for how essence and existence are related, and that it has continued relevance in anthropological thought. The paper concludes that the concept of "world" is central to understanding human experience and that anthropology must engage with this concept to understand the diversity of human realities.